A good analysis of the Iraq military situatuion

Read it all here.

The military problem - In World War II, our objective was "unconditional surrender" of our enemies. With unconditional surrender, the political problem is solved militarily but in a limited war, the political problem has a separate but related existence to the military problem. It is not enough to "rely on the generals." Solving the civilian-political problem is not their job. After all, what is their writ? To destroy our enemies or make friends with them? The civilians have to make that decision.

It is in the political-civilian area that we have been deficient in our strategy. It may well have been that our model before deposing Saddam was that there was an Iraqi polity that, absent the terror of Saddam, would be able to work out its problems through democratic means. If that was our model, it didn't work. We need a new model. Do we support majority rule - the al-Maliki government? That very likely means that we oppose the Sunni insurgency, even though the Sunni in some sense balance out the influence of the Iranian Shia. Well, that problem is not going to go away. If we are in a war, we have to want our side to win. If our side is to win, we must have a side. That nettle seems not to have been grasped, and no amount of surged troops is going to grasp it. It must be grasped as a matter of policy and then the troops can be given a military objective.

Should we surge troops? Wrong question. The question is (a) what is our objective and (b) what is our strategy for achieving it? Once we decide these two things, then we must find the leader who can execute on the strategy - the Ulysses Grant of this war - and not rotate him out until the job is finished.